The High Courts are equipped with inherent powers, under Section482 of the Code of Criminal procedural, 1973, to pass appropriate orders in order to do complete justice. Article226 of the Constitution of India also has such provision, giving the High Court of a State an ample power to issue Writs/ commands of several nature, like Writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, certiorari, etc. The power to quash an FIR has been read into these provisions by judicial precedents. Therefore, people routinely approach High Courts seeking the latter’s indulgence under Section 482 & Article 226 requesting for quashing of FIRs.
It is well settled law that the power of the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC can be exercised only when there is a proceeding pending before an inferior criminal court. A case can be said to be pending before the Court only if the Court, after taking cognizance of the offence on a police report (which is the final product after the conclusion of investigation) issues process to the accused. Merely because an FIR is sent to the Magistrate it does not mean that a case is pending before the Magistrate.
There are numerous grounds for getting the FIR quashed. The significant ones include the accused being dragged to court in frivolous cases and the case pending for a very long time without any progress in investigation. In the landmark case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Chaudhary BhajanLal and Ors. (1992 AIR 604), the Supreme Court laid down a few guidelines explaining when the power under Section 482 of CrPC should be used to quash FIRs. They have been reproduced below:
1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
4. Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
In another case, ParbatbhaiAahir&Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat &Anr., the Supreme Court after discussing various precedents on the subject summarized the following broad principles in relation to Section 482 for quashing FIRs: 1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised;
a) to secure the ends of justice or
b) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
5. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.
The above principles and guidelines altogether form the law dealing with the quashing of FIRs. They are very comprehensive and can address any issue arising before the High Court in a case concerning quashing of FIRs.